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UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES-ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr-"PER SE" NATURE
OF SECTION 2 (e)-The Federal Trade Commission, finding that a manufacturer and seller of dress patterns discriminated between competing purchasers in violation of section 2 (e) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the
Robinson-Patman Act,1 by paying transportation costs and donating storage
cabinets and monthly catalogues to its large variety store customers while
charging its smaller fabric store customers for the same services and facilities, issued a cease and desist order against these practices. The commission
held that neither the absence of competitive injury nor the presence of cost
justification are available as defenses to section 2 (e).2 On petition for re-

1 Section 2 (e) reads: "It shall be unlawful for any person to discriminate in favor of
one purchaser against another purchaser or purchasers of a commodity bought for resale,
with or without processing, by contracting to furnish or furnishing, or by contributing to
the furnishing of, any services or facilities connected with the processing, handling, sale,
or offering for sale of such commodity so purchased upon terms not accorded to all purchasers on proportionally equal terms." 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. (1958) §13 (e).
2 These defenses were undoubtedly suggested by §2 (a) of the Robinson-Patman Act
which reads in part: "That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, •••
either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price betlveen different purchasers of
commodities of like grade and quality, ••• where the effect of such discrimination may
be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce,
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view, the court of appeals remanded the case to allow the defendant to
submit a defense of cost justification.3 On certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court, held, reversed in part. Neither absence of competitive
injury nor the presence of cost justification constitute a defense to a primafacie violation of section 2 (e).4 Federal Trade Commission v. Simplicity
Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55 (1959).
By this decision the Court has committed itself to hold virtually every
prima-facie violation of section 2 (e) illegal "per se."5 The decision is in
accord with the previous holdings and dicta of lower courts that section
2 (e) violations were not subject to the defenses of cost justification6 or
absence of competitive injury.7 The lower court in the principal case
sought to avoid these prior decisions by arguing that the main clause of
section 2 (b), which places the burden of justification on a prima-facie section
2 (e) violator, would be meaningless if the violator could not use cost
justification as a defense.8 Although the legislative history of section 2 (b)
or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person.••• Provided, That nothing
herein contained shall prevent differentials which make only due allowance for differences
in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered.•.•" 49 Stat.
1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. (1958) §13 (a).
a Simplicity Pattern Co. v. FTC, (D.C. Cir. 1958) 258 F. (2d) 673, cert. granted 358
U.S. 897 (1958); comments, 68 YALE L. REv. 808 (1959), 26 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 128 (1958);
notes, 28 FORD. L. REv. 144 (1959), 72 HARv. L. REv. 385 (1958), 42 MARQ. L. REv. 262 (1958).
4 In all probability §2 (d) of the Robinson-Patman Act, which prohibits sellers from
making discriminatory payments to competing purchasers for services or facilities furnished
by the latter, will receive the same interpretation as §2 (e), since past cases have interpreted them in the same light although their language differs somewhat. See, e.g., Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., (8th Cir. 1945) 150 F. (2d) 988; United CigarWhelan Stores Corp. v. H. Weinreich Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1952) 107 F. Supp. 89.
5 "Per se" violations, in antitrust cases, are those practices which the courts conclusively
presume are illegal or unreasonable, sans defenses. For a recent case discussing the unreasonable "per se" doctrine under the antitrust laws, see Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); note, 57 MICH. L. REv. 1244 (1959). The only defense
that remains is found in the proviso of §2 (b) which states: "That nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing that •.•
the furnishing of services or facilities ..• was made in good faith to meet •.. the services
or facilities furnished by a competitor." 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. (1958) §13 (b).
6 Great Atlantic &: Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC, (3d Cir. 1939) 106 F. (2d) 667. This was
a §2 (c) case with dicta that cost justification could not be a defense to §2 (e).
7 Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, (4th Cir. 1945) 150 F. (2d) 607 (dictum as to
competitive injury); Oliver Bros., Inc. v. FTC, (4th Cir. 1939) 102 F. (2d) 763 (dictum as
to competitive injury); Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1946) 156 F. (2d) 132; Corn
Products Refining Co. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1944) 144 F. (2d) 211, affd. on other grounds 324
U.S. 726 (1945). In the two cases which squarely hold that competitive injury need not
be shown in a §2 (e) violation, the courts did not discuss the legislative history of the
section, assuming that §2 (e) was meant to be unqualified since §2 (a) justifications were
not specifically set out in §2 (e).
s Simplicity Pattern Co. v. FTC, note 3 supra, at 679. The main clause of §2 (b) reads:
"Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under this section, that there
has been discrimination in .•• services or facilities furnished, the burden of rebutting the
prima-facie case thus made by showing justification shall be upon the person charged."
49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U .S.C. (1958) §13 (b). Emphasis added.
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is sparse, the Supreme Court seems correct in rejecting this argument on
the ground that section 2 (b) was intended to be procedural, having no
substantive content.9 But by annexing to their holding a footnote stating
that the competitive injury and cost-differential defenses found in section
2 (a) cannot be read directly into section 2 (e),10 the Court apparently disregards its earlier pronouncement that it has a "duty to reconcile [interpretations of the Robinson-Patman Act], except where Congress has told us
not to, with the broader antitrust policies that have been laid down by
Congress."11 The Court did not cite any convincing legislative history
showing congressional intent that section 2 (e) was to be interpreted as a
"per se" statute;12 indeed there is some evidence that the sponsors of the
Robinson-Patman Act intended that all the sections be construed in harmony with section 2 (a)13 which prohibits direct or indirect price discrimination only where the effect may injure competition or cannot be cost
justified. The main purpose of section 2 (e) was to stop sellers from indirect
price discrimination through discriminatory furnishing of advertising services.14 But the principal case precludes any argument that section 2 (e) is
a specific instance of the "indirect" price discriminations prohibited by
section 2 (a) and therefore that section 2 (a) justifications should be available as section 2 (e) defenses15 in order to effectuate basic antitrust philoso9 This section was referred to during debates as a "procedural" or "burden of proof"
provision. See, e.g., 80 CONG. REc. 8110, 8231, 9414, 9418 (1936). Cf. Automatic Canteen
Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953). For like interpretations of §2 (b), see AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr, rev. ed., 83 (1959);
comment, 68 YALE L. REv. 808 (1959).
10 Principal case at 71, note 18.
11 Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, note 9 supra, at 74 (holding that a prima-facie
case was not established under §2 (f) of the Robinson-Patman Act until proved that the
buyer was aware that the price concession he was receiving was an illegal discrimination).
12 For arguments that §2 (e) should not be interpreted as a "per se" section, see REPORT
OF THE A'ITORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMrrrEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws 191
(1955); AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN
Acr, rev. ed., 122 (1959); Oppenheim, "Should the Robinson-Patman Act be Amended?"
CCH ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr SYMPOSIUM 145 (1948).
13 "There is nothing in it to penalize, shackle, or discourage efficiency, or to reward
inefficiency•••• [None of the] physical economies that are to be found in mass buying
and distribution ••• are in the remotest degree disturbed by this bill•••• It is the design
and intent of this bill to strengthen existing antitrust laws, prevent unfair-price discriminations, and preserve competition in interstate commerce." H. Rep. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d
sess., p. 17 (1936).
14 See 80 CONG. REc. 7759 (1936), where Mr. Patman said, "Large manufacturers have
been coerced into giving certain large mass buyers great reductions in prices under the
, guise of advertising allowances. This bill will not prohibit advertising allowances but it
will prohibit advertising allowances to be used as a guise for price reductions. • • ." See
also, H. Rep. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 15-16 (1936); H. Rep. 2966, 84th Cong., 2d sess.,
p. 97 (1956); 80 CoNG. REc. 3114, 6282 (1936).
15 For authorities advocating this interpretation of §2 (e), see, generally, Oppenheim,
"Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy," 50
MICH. L. REv. 1139 at 1206-1207 (1952); Rowe, "How To Comply with Sections 2 (c)- (f),"
CCH 1957 ANTITRUST LAW SYMPOSIUM; REPORT OF THE A'ITORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL
COMMrrrEE To STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws 191-193 (1955).
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phy of maintaining but not sterilizing competition.1 6 Since the economic
effects of direct price discrimination and indirect price discrimination
(through the furnishing of services or facilities) are basically the same, it
seems that they should be treated alike where Congress has not clearly
indicated differential treatment.1 7
As a result of the principal case the only avenue left for using a standard
of reasonableness, rather than a "per se" approach, in applying section 2 (e)
is to follow the Court's suggestion that the commission has recognized that
the services rendered need not be exactly the same for every customer to be
on "proportionally equal terms" within the meaning of section 2 (e).18 If
the Federal Trade Commission and the courts will take a liberal view of
what are "proportionally equal terms," perhaps some amount of cost
justification could be brought into the determination of section 2 (e) violations.19 However, folloW!ng this decision that section 2 (e) discriminations
cannot be justified by lack of competitive injury or cost differentials, it
seems improbable that the commission and courts will interpret the "proportionally equal terms" clause as a means of reconciling section 2 (e) with
the interpretation of section 2 (a). Hence a legislative amendment to the
Robinson-Patman Act seems to be the only solution left to effectuate such
a reconciliation.
Charles R. Sharp, S.Ed.
16 "The heart of our national' economic policy long has been faith in the value of
competition. In the Sherman and Clayton Acts, as well as in the Robinson-Patman Act,
'Congress was dealing with competition, which it sought to protect, and monopoly, which
it sought to prevent.' ••• Congress did not seek by the Robinson-Patman Act ••• to
abolish competition••• .'' Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 at 248-249 (1951) (hold·
ing that meeting competition is a defense to §2 (a) although competition is injured).
17 In the past the courts and the commission have not hesitated in reading §2 (a)
phrases into §§2 (e) or 2 (d). See, e.g., Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. FTC, note 7 supra ["engaged
in commerce" and "in the course of such commerce" read into §2 (e)]; Golf Ball Mfgrs.
Assn., 26 F.T.C. 824 (1938) and Atlanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1958) 258 F.
(2d) 365 [commodities of "like grade and quality" read into §2 (d)].
18 Principal case at 61, note 4. Apart from services and facilities furnished only to
variety stores, Simplicity also furnished some services and facilities to the fabric stores
which the variety stores did not make use of, although they were available to them. The
Court intimated this might have constituted "proportionally equal terms," but since it
had not been argued that Simplicity was thereby treating its customers on "proportionally
equal terms" the Court did not pass on the question.
19 The FTC has indicated it would take a broad view of proportional equality in
Lever Brothers Co., 50 F.T.C. 494 (1953), where in regard to §2 (d) it said a "plan providing payment for promotional services and facilities •.• must be honest in its purpose
and fair and reasonable in its application." See also Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co., 50 F.T.C.
525 (1953); Procter &: Gamble Distributing Co., 50 F.T.C. 513 (1953); Cosmetic and Toilet
Preparations Industry Rules, 3 CCH TRADE R.Ec:. REP. 1]20,221 (1954). On the difficulties
of the clause "proportionally equal terms," see, generally, AusnN, PRICE D1sCRIMINATION
AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr, rev. ed., 146 (1959); Layton,
"Demonstrators on Proportionally Equal Terms," CCH ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr SYMPOSIUM
38 (1948).

